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Abstract 
This study investigates the incentives for R&D output sharing in a mixed duopoly and shows 
that public firm chooses full sharing of their R&D output, whereas private firm enjoys 
free-riding. We then devise an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy scheme, which can 
internalize R&D spillovers and induce both firms to earn higher payoffs through full sharing 
of their R&D output. We also show that an R&D subsidy policy is welfare-superior to a 
production subsidy policy.  
JEL Classifications: L13; L32; H21 
Keywords: Agreement-based R&D subsidy; Mixed duopoly; Production output subsidy; 
R&D output sharing 
Running Head: R&D Output Sharing in a Mixed Duopoly 
1. Introduction 
In the last generation, there has been considerable empirical and theoretical works on the 
R&D (research and development) incentives, and a significant number of studies conclude 
that R&D spillovers exist and their implications on innovation and competition policy are 
presently gaining importance in economies.1 The rate of spillovers in the literature is usually 
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1 See, for example, d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Kamien et al. (1992) Poyago-Theotoky (1995), Beath, 
et al. (1998), Gil Molto, et al. (2011) and Kesavayuth, et al (2017) among others. 
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defined as institutional and/or technological factors and thus, most of the existing literature 
treats the R&D spillovers in innovation as exogenous.  
However, some economists have investigated the extent to which R&D activities might allow 
firms to internalize R&D spillovers. They examined the role of endogenous spillovers 
whereby spillovers arise from information-sharing and/or research design through 
firm-specific strategies. From a theoretical viewpoint, for example, Katsoulacos and Ulph 
(1988), Poyago-Theotoky (1999) and Baranes and Tropeano (2003) construct a model for 
endogenous R&D spillovers in which firms choose the spillovers rate for R&D output 
sharing in the non-cooperative equilibrium within a RJV (research joint venture).2 The main 
focus of the literature is on a comparison between non-cooperative R&D and the case in 
which firms coordinate their R&D activities to maximize their joint profits (through RJV or a 
R&D cartel).  
However, all these research studies consider the case of ex-ante identical symmetric private 
firms and as a result, if they fail to account for RJVs, the effect of R&D spillovers is to 
reduce the amount of R&D undertaken by each firm. This occurs because the profit from 
investing in R&D cannot be fully appropriated. Thus, knowledge sharing between the 
competing firms can lead one of them to free-ride by benefiting from the knowledge 
spillovers in the innovating activities without exerting any effort.  
Policy makers have recognized the importance of R&D activities and have thus enacted 
various policies to encourage them. Among the effective policy alternatives in the real world, 
governments are continuously increasing R&D subsidization toward public institutions and 
organizations, such that public firms are the key players in R&D-intensive industries in 
                                                  
2 Further, many empirical works and case studies also report widespread voluntary exchange of information and 
knowledge sharing between firms in the industry. See, for example, Jaffe et al. (1993), Saxenian (1994) and 
Keller (2000). 
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contemporary economies, such as in healthcare, medicine, energy, and bio-agriculture.3 For 
example, Katsoulacos (1993) and Conte et al (2009) reported that the majority of RJVs 
supported by European RTD (research, technological development and demonstration) 
framework programs give an R&D subsidy to the participating firms if they share 
information through integrated projects or coordination actions.4 
Much of the recent study of the relationship between R&D activity and subsidies has been 
conducted in the context of mixed oligopolies, where public and private firms compete in 
R&D investments.5 For example, Zikos (2007), Gil Molto, et al. (2011), Kesavayuth and 
Zikos (2013) and Haruna and Goel (2017) investigated the role of R&D subsidies as a policy 
instrument in mixed oligopolies. However, they also treated the R&D spillovers as exogenous 
in the model of cost-reducing R&D. 
The policy consequences of R&D subsidies in mixed markets are somewhat in contrast to 
those in the analysis of private markets. Due to the asymmetry in the objective functions that 
private firms maximize their profits whereas public firms are controlled by the government, a 
symmetric equilibrium in information sharing does not occur in mixed oligopolies. In 
particular, if we assume a benevolent government that maximizes social welfare, public firms 
invest more as the rate of spillovers is higher, whereas private firms invest less in the absence 
of subsidies. As a result, public firms would like to internalize the externality of the 
                                                  
3 Aanestad, et al. (2003) and Godø, et al. (2003) provided attentional case studies in the medical and energy 
sectors in European and OECD countries, and reported that public firms are key players in R&D-intensive 
industries. See also other interesting examples in Gil-Moltó, et al. (2011). 
4 The 8th framework program of EU research funding is running for 2014-2020 under the name of Horizon 2020. 
For more detailed information, see http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/h2020-sections.  
5 The increasing interest in mixed markets stems from their importance in regulatory reforms in the economies 
of developed regions, such as Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, and transitionary economies, such as those of 
China and Eastern Europe. Regarding R&D competition without government subsidies, Delbono and Denicolo 
(1993), Poyago-Theotoky (1998), Ishibashi and Matsumura (2006), Heywood and Ye (2009) and Nie and Yang 
(2015) examined R&D competition in mixed oligopolies. 
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knowledge spillover but private firms prefer to be free-riders. Therefore, policy makers 
should consider the importance of R&D policies regarding private firms in order to 
encourage their R&D knowledge sharing. 
In this study, we consider a mixed duopoly where a public firm competes with a private firm 
in both R&D investment and production output by endogeneizing the choice of the rate of 
R&D spillovers between the firms. We investigate the incentives of R&D output sharing and 
show that a public firm will choose full sharing whereas a private firm will enjoy free-riding. 
It shows that the internalization of externalities improves social welfare even though a private 
incentive does not incorporate externalities. We then devise an agreement-based incentive 
R&D subsidy scheme in which both firms earn higher payoffs by full sharing of their R&D 
output. This is because (i) the agreement can make each firm receive a beneficial cost 
spillover with a maximum rate from its rival firm, and (ii) the subsidy can increase the private 
firm’s profits. Thus, it benefits both firms to internalize R&D spillovers by compensating for 
the loss of information sharing. Further, we show that an agreement-based R&D subsidy 
policy is welfare-superior to a production subsidy policy. This is because an incentive R&D 
subsidy can compensate for the wasteful cost asymmetry associated with the public firm’s 
higher production output relative to that of the private firm.6 
The organization of this paper is as follows: In Section 2, we present a mixed duopoly model, 
in which a public firm competes with a private firm in both R&D investment and production 
output. In Section 3, we show that in the absence of government subsidy, a public firm 
chooses full sharing of R&D output, whereas a private firm enjoys free-riding. In section 4, 
we devise an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy scheme to internalize R&D spillovers 
                                                  
6 It is well-known in the literature on mixed oligopolies with R&D investments that a public firm provides more 
production output than the private firm even though the public firm undertakes more R&D, and thus the 
distribution of production costs across firms is not efficient. On this point, see Gil Molto, et al. (2011), 
Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013), Lee and Tomaru (2017) and Lee, et al (2017). 
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in which both firms earn higher payoffs by full sharing of their R&D output. In Section 5, we 
compare the R&D subsidy with a production subsidy and show that an agreement-based 
R&D subsidy is welfare-superior to a production subsidy. Finally, we conclude in Section 6. 
2. The Model 
Consider a Cournot duopoly market, where two firms produce homogeneous goods. Let the 
inverse demand function be ܲሺܳሻ ൌ ܽ െ ܳ, where ܲ is market price, Qሺൌ ݍ଴ ൅ ݍଵሻ	 is the 
total market production, and ݍ௜ is the production output of firm i,	ሺ݅ ൌ 0,1ሻ, respectively. 
Then, the consumer surplus can be computed as CS ൌ ܳଶ/2. 
We consider that each firm has an ex-ante identical cost function with decreasing returns to 
scale in production and R&D investment. In particular, we assume the following specific cost 
functions, proposed by Gil Molto, et al. (2011) and Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013): 
ܥሺݍ௜, ݔ௜ሻ ൌ ൫ܿ െ ݔ௜ െ ௝݀ݔ௝൯ݍ௜ ൅ ݍ௜ଶ and ߁ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ݔ௜ଶ,   ݅ ് ݆ ൌ 0,1        (1) 
The ex-ante cost ܿ (ܽ ൐ ܿ ൐ 0ሻ	is reduced by each firm’s R&D output, ݔ௜, and rival’s R&D 
output, ௝݀ݔ௝, where ௝݀ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ denotes the R&D output sharing rate, which is determined 
by rival firm. It implies that R&D investment can reduce a firm’s own cost by ݔ௜ and the 
rival firm’s cost by ݀௜ݔ௜ per unit of output, depending on the endogenous choice of R&D 
output sharing rate. For instance, ௝݀ ൌ 0 represents perfect protection of R&D output while 
௝݀ ൌ 1 represents full sharing of R&D output. Further, the firm has to spend the amount of 
R&D investment, ߁ሺݔ௜ሻ ൌ ݔ௜ଶ, to implement the cost-reducing R&D. 
A few remarks are in order. First, we assume a quadratic production cost function, which is 
standard in mixed market literature, to rule out the uninteresting case of a public monopoly. 
Second, the production cost shows that both a firm’s R&D output and the rival’s R&D output 
sharing rate shift the firm’s marginal production cost function downwards, as డ஼డ௤೔ ൌ ܿ െ ݔ௜ െ
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௝݀ݔ௝൅2ݍ௜, but do not alter its slope. Finally, we assume that the R&D spillovers rate is solely 
limited by the information that the providing firm allows (or protects). That is, the amount of 
knowledge spillovers that the recipient can receive depends on the provider.7  
The profit of the firm and social welfare functions, respectively, are as follows: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ൫ܽ െ ݍ଴ െ ݍଵሻݍ௜ െ ሺܿ െ ݔ௜ െ ௝݀ݔ௝൯ݍ௜ െ ݍ௜ଶ െ ݔ௜ଶ,						݅ ് ݆ ൌ 0,1.      ( 2 ) 
ܹ ൌ ܥܵ ൅ ߨ଴ ൅ ߨଵ.              ( 3 ) 
We consider a mixed duopoly market where a profit-maximizing private firm, firm 1, 
competes with a state-owned public firm, firm 0, which maximizes social welfare. In the 
followings, we will examine two different cases. In Section 3, we consider the case without a 
government subsidy and examine a three-stage simultaneous game: In the first stage, each 
firm chooses whether to share its R&D output with its rival. Then, observing the agreement 
on the R&D output sharing, each firm chooses its R&D investment level in the second stage 
and its production output level in the third stage. In Section 4, we extend the game structure 
and further consider the intervention of the government before the first stage of the game. 
Then, we construct an agreement-based R&D subsidy scheme. We analyze the subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium by backward induction.  
3. The Analysis without Government Intervention 
In the third stage, the first-order conditions of the private firm and the public firm yields the 
following reaction functions for the firms: 
ݍ଴ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻି௤భା௫బାௗభ௫భଷ  and ݍଵ ൌ
ሺ௔ି௖ሻି௤బା௫భାௗబ௫బ
ସ .        ( 4 ) 
                                                  
7 However, a recipient firm’s capacity to benefit from the R&D conducted by other firms may also depend on 
the amount it spends on R&D activities. In this sense, the recipient of a spillover may be able to affect the 
maximum amount of the spillovers rate it receives through the actions it takes. 
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Noting that both firms’ decisions on the final products are strategic substitutes, we have the 
equilibrium outputs of the second stage: 
ݍ଴∗ ൌ ଷሺ௔ି௖ሻାସ௫బିௗబ௫బି௫భାସௗభ௫భଵଵ  and  ݍଵ∗ ൌ
ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻି௫బାଷௗబ௫బାଷ௫భିௗభ௫భ
ଵଵ .       ( 5 ) 
Then, we have డ௤బ
∗
డ௫೔ ൐ 	
డ௤భ∗
డ௫೔ ൐ 0: an increase in R&D by one firm increases the production of 
both firms, but that of the public firm is higher than that of the private firm. Thus, R&D 
investment will increase total industry productions, that is, Q∗ ൌ ݍ଴∗ ൅ ݍଵ∗ and డ୕
∗
డ௫೔ ൐ 0. 
In the second stage, from the first-order conditions of public and private firms, using the 
envelope theorem and rearranging for the necessary calculations yield the following reaction 
functions:  
ݔ଴ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଷଵାଶ଼ௗబሻିሺଵସିଵସௗబሺଷିௗభሻିସହௗభሻ௫భଵଽ଻ାଵସௗబሺଶିଷௗబሻ  and ݔଵ ൌ
ଶሺଷିௗభሻሺଶሺ௔ି௖ሻିሺଵିଷௗబሻ௫బሻ
ଵ଴ଷାଶሺ଺ିௗభሻௗభ .      (6) 
It is noteworthy that the public firm’s decision on R&D investment is strategic substitute 
(complement) to the private firm’s decision when 14 െ 14݀଴ሺ3 െ ݀ଵሻ െ 45݀଴ ൏ ሺ൐ሻ0, while 
the private firm’s decision is strategic substitute (complement) to the public firm’s decision 
when ݀଴ ൏ ሺ൐ሻ1/3. Then, we have the equilibrium R&D investment of the first stage: 
ݔ଴∗ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଶହାଶ଼ௗబାଶሺସିௗభሻௗభሻଵ଺଻ିସଶௗబమାଶଶௗభିସௗభమାଶ଼ௗబି଺ௗబௗభାଶௗబௗభమ and ݔଵ
∗ ൌ ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଷାௗబሻሺଷିௗభሻଵ଺଻ିସଶௗబమାଶଶௗభିସௗభమାଶ଼ௗబି଺ௗబௗభାଶௗబௗభమ    (7) 
Thus, we have the following equilibrium production outputs: 
ݍ଴∗ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻሺହଷାௗబሺሺଵହିଵସௗబሻሻାସሺሺସିௗభሻሻௗభሻଵ଺଻ିସଶௗబమାଶଶௗభିସௗభమାଶ଼ௗబି଺ௗబௗభାଶௗబௗభమ  a n d  ݍଵ
∗ ൌ ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଷାௗబሻଵ଺଻ିସଶௗబమାଶଶௗభିସௗభమାଶ଼ௗబି଺ௗబௗభାଶௗబௗభమ   ( 8 ) 
The profit of the private firm and the social welfare at the equilibrium, respectively, can be 
rewritten as follows: 
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ߨଵ∗ሺ݀଴, ݀ଵሻ ൌ ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻ
మሺଷାௗబሻమሺଵ଴ଷାଶሺ଺ିௗభሻௗభሻ
ሺଵ଺଻ିସଶௗబమାଶଶௗభିସௗభమାଶ଼ௗబି଺ௗబௗభାଶௗబௗభమሻమ,         (9) 
ܹ∗ሺ݀଴, ݀ଵሻ ൌ
	
ሺ௔ି௖ሻమሾௗబቀଷ଺଺ଶିௗబ൫ଶ଻଴ଷାଽ଼ௗబሺ଼ିଷௗబሻ൯ቁା଼ሺ଻ସି଼ଵௗబሻௗబௗభିସሺଶିௗబሻሺସ଼ାସଵௗబሻௗభమ
ା଼ሺ଻ସି଼ଵௗబሻௗబௗభିସሺଶିௗబሻሺସ଼ାସଵௗబሻௗభమିଵ଺଴ௗభయାଶ଴ௗభరା଼ሺଽ଺଻ାଷ଺ଵௗభሻሿ
ሺଵ଺଻ିସଶௗబమାଶଶௗభିସௗభమାଶ଼ௗబି଺ௗబௗభାଶௗబௗభమሻమ     (10) 
In the first stage, each firm decides at which degree it will share its R&D output with its rival 
firm. Regarding the public firm’s incentive, we can show that డௐ
∗
డௗబ ൐ 0 for any ݀ଵ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ. 
This represents that the public firm’s dominant strategy is to choose full sharing of its R&D 
output, i.e., ݀଴∗ ൌ 1. This is because the public firm can internalize the externalities in R&D 
output to improve welfare, which is the objective of a public firm. It also implies that the 
private firm’s decision on R&D investment is always a strategic complement to the public 
firm’s decision because ݀଴∗ ൐ 1/3 at equilibrium. Regarding the private firm’s incentive, 
however, we can show that డగభడௗభ ൏ 0 when ݀଴ ൌ 1. This represents that the private firm 
chooses perfect protection of its R&D output at equilibrium, i.e., ݀ଵ∗ ൌ 0. This is also 
because a profit-maximizing private firm is not willing to internalize the externalities to enjoy 
a free-riding effect. It is interesting to note that the public firm’s decision on R&D investment 
is always a strategic substitute to that of the private firm at equilibrium. 
From (7) and (8), we have: 
ݔ଴∗ ൌ ହଷሺ௔ି௖ሻଵହଷ ≅ 0.3464ሺܽ െ ܿሻ ൐ ݔଵ∗ ൌ
ଶସሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ଵହଷ ≅ 0.1569ሺܽ െ ܿሻ	and  
ݍ଴∗ ൌ ହସሺ௔ି௖ሻଵହଷ ≅ 0.353ሺܽ െ ܿሻ ൐ ݍଵ∗ ൌ
ସସሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ଵହଷ ≅ 0.2876ሺܽ െ ܿሻ. 
Further, from (9) and (10), we have: 
ߨଵ∗ሺ1,1ሻ ≅ 0.130ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ൏ ߨଵ∗ሺ1,0ሻ ≅ 	0.141ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ and  
ܹ∗ሺ1,1ሻ ≅ 0.378ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ൐ ܹ∗ሺ1,0ሻ ≅ 0.350ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ. 
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These represent that there is a conflict of incentives between the public and private firms in 
deciding the agreement on the R&D output sharing. 
Proposition 1. In the equilibrium of R&D output sharing, the public firm chooses full sharing 
and undertakes a higher R&D investment, whereas the private firm chooses perfect 
protection and undertakes a lower R&D investment. 
4. Agreement-based Incentive R&D Subsidy Scheme 
In this section, we consider the commitment of the government before the first stage of the 
previously discussed game, and provide an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy scheme. 
In particular, we assume that the government can provide an R&D subsidy only when both 
the public and private firms make a mutual agreement on the R&D output sharing: if they fail 
to make this agreement, no subsidy will be provided. 
We now examine the effect of an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy when both firms 
make a mutual agreement regarding the rate of R&D spillovers, ݀௜. As shown in Proposition 
1, welfare is maximized when ݀௜ ൌ 1 and thus, the public firm will prefer that the private 
firm chooses ݀ଵ ൌ 1. Further, due to the positive externalities, the private firm will always 
prefer that the public firm chooses ݀଴ ൌ 1. Therefore, it is sufficient for a government to 
devise an incentive R&D subsidy scheme, which will induce the private firm to choose 
݀ଵ ൌ 1 when ݀଴ ൌ 1. This implies that a government’s optimal choice is to provide an R&D 
subsidy only when the private firm chooses ݀ଵ ൌ 1, under which the subsidized profit is 
always higher than that with ݀ଵ ൏ 1. Thus, no subsidy policy is sufficient when ݀ଵ ൏ 1. 
In the following analysis, we assume that the government provides a unit subsidy on the 
firm’s R&D output. Then, the subsidized profit of the firm under the incentive R&D subsidy 
policy with full sharing, that is, when both ݀௜ ൌ 1, is as follows: 
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ߨ௜ ൌ ൫ܽ െ ݍ଴ െ ݍଵሻݍ௜ െ ሺܿ െ ݔ௜ െ ݔ௝൯ݍ௜ െ ݍ௜ଶ െ ݔ௜ଶ ൅ ݏ௫ݔ௜,			݅ ് ݆ ൌ 0,1.	    (11) 
where ݏ௫ is the R&D subsidy rate. We assume that the subsidy is financed by the taxpayers 
in a lump-sum manner, and thus, it does not directly influence the welfare function. Note that 
the total R&D output, X ൌ ݔ௜ ൅ ݔ௝, affects the production cost of both firms. 
In the below analysis, note that the R&D subsidy affects each firm’s R&D decision in the 
second stage but does not explicitly affect their production output decision in the third stage. 
In the second stage, from the first-order conditions of the maximization problems of the 
public and private firm in terms of R&D investment, we have the following reaction 
functions: 
ݔ଴ ൌ ହଽሺ௔ି௖ሻାହଽ௫భଵ଼ଷ  and ݔଵ ൌ
ଵ଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻାଵ଺௫బାଵଶଵ௦ೣ
ଶଶ଺ .       (12) 
The reaction function of each firm increases with the rival’s R&D investment. It is 
noteworthy that R&D investments under full sharing of R&D output are strategic 
complements for both firms. An increase in R&D investment by one firm leads to an increase 
in the production output by its rival firm, thereby increasing both firms’ incentives to conduct 
R&D. Then, we have the following equilibrium R&D investments of the second stage: 
ݔ଴ோ ൌ ଵଶଽ଼ሺ௔ି௖ሻା଺ସଽ௦ೣଷ଺଻ସ
வ
ழ ݔଵோ ൌ
ଷହଶሺ௔ି௖ሻାଶ଴ଵଷ௦ೣ
ଷ଺଻ସ  if ݏ௫
ழ
வ
ଽସ଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ଵଷ଺ସ ≅ 0.6935ሺa െ cሻ ൐ 0.    (13) 
These equations show that the relative R&D outputs depend on the R&D subsidy, which 
affects the asymmetric distribution of the production costs between the firms. In particular, 
the public firm undertakes more (less) R&D than the private firm as the R&D subsidy rate is 
lower (higher). Further, we have that డ௫భ
ೃ
డ௦ೣ ൐ 	
డ௫బೃ
డ௦ೣ ൐ 0	, which shows that both firms’ R&D 
investments increase with the R&D subsidy, but the increasing rate of the private firm’s R&D 
is higher than that of the public firm. Hence, the total R&D output, Xୖ ൌ ݔ଴ோ ൅ ݔଵோ, also 
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increases with the R&D subsidy, that is, ߲ܺோ/߲ݏ௫ ൐ 0. 
Thus, we have the following equilibrium production outputs: 
ݍ଴ோ ൌ ଺଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻାଷଷ௦ೣଵ଺଻ ൐ ݍଵோ ൌ
ସସሺ௔ି௖ሻାଶଶ௦ೣ
ଵ଺଻ .        (14) 
This shows that the public firm provides more production output than the private firm even 
though the public firm undertakes more or less R&D, depending on the R&D subsidy. Note 
that the R&D subsidy can induce both private and public firms to enlarge their production 
outputs and R&D investments as well. Therefore, the total industry outputs, Qୖ ൌ ݍ଴ோ ൅ ݍଵோ, 
increases with the R&D subsidy, that is, ߲ܳோ/߲ݏ௫ ൐ 0. 
The government chooses an R&D subsidy rate to maximize the social welfare function: 
ܹ ൌ ሺொೃሻమଶ ൅ ߨ଴ሺݔ଴ோ, ݔଵோ, ݍ଴ோ, ݍଵோሻ ൅ ߨଵሺݔ଴ோ, ݔଵோ, ݍ଴ோ, ݍଵோሻെݏ௫ሺݔ଴ோ ൅ ݔଵோሻ.           (15) 
Then, we have the following optimal R&D subsidy rate: 
	ݏ௫ ൌ ସଷሺ௔ି௖ሻ଺ଶ ≅ 0.6935ሺa െ cሻ ൐ 0.          ( 1 6 ) 
Finally, the equilibrium outcomes under the full sharing of R&D output are as follows: 
ݔ଴ோ ൌ ݔଵோ ൌ ହଽሺ௔ି௖ሻଵଶସ ≅ 0.476ሺܽ െ ܿሻ and 
ݍ଴ோ ൌ ଷଷሺ௔ି௖ሻ଺ଶ ≅ 0.532ሺܽ െ ܿሻ ൐ ݍଵோ ൌ
ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ଷଵ ≅ 0.333ሺܽ െ ܿሻ. 
Note that ݔ଴ோ ൌ ݔଵோ and ݍ଴ோ ൐ ݍଵோ at equilibrium. It represents that the optimal R&D subsidy 
can induce both firms to undertake the same R&D investments, which will be fully 
internalized through the full sharing of R&D spillovers, but the public firm still provides 
more production output than the private firm, which results in a higher marginal production 
cost for the public firm than that of the private firm. It also provides the following profit and 
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social welfare under the incentive R&D subsidy policy, respectively: 
ߨଵோ ൌ ହସ଺ହሺ௔ି௖ሻ
మ
ଵହଷ଻଺ ≅ 0.355ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ and ܹோ ൌ
ହଽ
ଵଶସ ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ≅ 0.476ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ. 
Proposition 2. Under the incentive R&D subsidy, both firms agree on the full sharing of their 
R&D outputs and undertake the same R&D investments. 
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the private firm chooses the full sharing of its R&D output 
and can maximize its profit, that is, ߨଵோሺ1,1ሻ ≅ 0.355ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ൐ ߨଵ∗ሺ1,0ሻ ≅ 	0.141ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ.      
5. Comparison and Discussions 
5.1 Comparison with efficient outcomes 
Under the incentive R&D subsidy scheme, the public firm still provides more production 
output than that of the private firm even though both firms undertake the same R&D 
investments. Thus, the distribution of production costs across the two firms is not efficient. 
This implies that the obtained welfare in ܹோ is the second-best optimum. In this subsection, 
we will examine the efficient first-best allocations and investigate the welfare consequences 
of the incentive R&D subsidy scheme. 
In the first-best allocations, the social welfare is maximized under the full sharing of R&D 
outputs and the marginal cost pricing rule in both R&D investments and production outputs. 
Then, we can directly obtain the following efficient outcomes: 
ݔ଴ி ൌ ݔଵி ൌ ௔ି௖ଶ , ݍ଴ி ൌ ݍଵி ൌ
௔ି௖
ଶ  and ܹி ൌ ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ. 
The efficient outcomes indicate that both firms undertake the same R&D investments and 
provide the same production output, which yields a symmetric distribution of production 
costs to two firms and the market price equals each firm’s marginal production cost. Then, 
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comparing the efficient outcomes with the second-best outcomes under the incentive R&D 
subsidy shows that both firms undertake less R&D investments, i.e., ݔ௜∗ ൐ ݔ௜ோ, but the public 
firm over-produces, whereas the private firm under-produces, i.e., ݍ଴ோ ൐ ݍ௜ி ൐ ݍଵோ. Thus, in 
addition to the R&D subsidy, other policy instrument is required, which results in the 
redistribution of the production output from the higher-marginal-cost public firm to the 
lower-marginal-cost private firm. For example, if the government is able to use the optimal 
policy mix of R&D and production output subsidies, it can be easily shown that the first-best 
outcome is obtained and thus social welfare is maximized.8 
5.2 Comparison with production output subsidy 
Instead of the incentive R&D subsidy scheme, we can consider an incentive production 
output subsidy scheme and examine the welfare effects.9 We assume that government can 
provide a unit subsidy on the firm’s production output level under a mutual R&D agreement 
with full sharing of the R&D output. Then, it can decide the optimal production output 
subsidy rate to maximize welfare. The subsidized profit of the private firm in (11) includes 
ݏ௤ݍ௜ as a production subsidy rate, instead of ݏ௫ݔ௜ in the R&D subsidy term. Using the same 
procedures taken in the previous section for the R&D subsidy, we have the following results 
under a production subsidy. 
In the third stage, the production output subsidy decreases the production output of public 
                                                  
8 See Zikos (2007) and Lee and Tomaru (2017) on the optimal subsidization policy mix. On the other hand, 
Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) and Lee, et al. (2017) compared the relative welfare effects of an R&D subsidy 
and a production output subsidy in a mixed duopoly. 
9 The use of a production subsidy has been proposed in the literature of mixed oligopolies, in which the 
so-called “irrelevance result” is argued, which states that privatization does not alter welfare as long as the 
regulator can subsidize the production output. For a recent discussion, see Matsumura and Tomaru (2013, 2015), 
Matsumura and Okumura (2013, 2017) and Lee, et al. (2017). 
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firm while it increases that of the private firm as follows:10 
ݍ଴௢ ൌ ଷሺ௔ି௖ା௫బା௫భሻି௦೜ଵଵ  and ݍଵ௢ ൌ
ଶሺ௔ି௖ା௫బା௫భሻାଷ௦೜
ଵଵ .       (17) 
In the second stage, we have the following relationship between the two firms’ equilibrium 
R&D investments: 
ݔ଴௢ ൌ ଶହଶ௦೜ାଵଶଽ଼ሺ௔ି௖ሻଷ଺଻ସ
வ
ழ ݔଵ௢ ൌ
ଷହଶሺ௔ି௖ሻାସ଴଼௦೜
ଷ଺଻ସ  if ݏ௤
ழ
வ
ଽସ଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ଵହ଺ ≅ 6.064ሺa െ cሻ ൐ 0.      (18) 
Note that the public firm undertakes more (less) R&D than the private firm as production 
output subsidy is lower (higher). Further, we have డ௫భ
೚
డ௦೜ ൐ 	
డ௫బ೚
డ௦೜ ൐ 0	. This shows that both 
firms’ R&D investments increases with the output subsidy, but the rate of increase for the 
private firm’s R&D is higher than that of the public firm’s R&D.  
In the first stage, we have the following relationship between the two firms’ equilibrium 
production outputs: 
ݍ଴௢ ൌ ଺଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻି଻௦೜ଵ଺଻ ൐ 0 if ݏ௤ ൏
଺଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
଻ ≅ 9.4286ሺa െ cሻ.       (20) 
ݍ଴௢ ൌ ଺଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻି଻௦೜ଵ଺଻
வ
ழ ݍଵ௢ ൌ
ସସሺ௔ି௖ሻାହଵ௦೜
ଵ଺଻  if ݏ௤
ழ
வ
ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ଶଽ ≅ 0.3793ሺa െ cሻ ൐ 0.    (21) 
It is noteworthy that the production output subsidy decreases the production output of the 
public firm while it increases that of the private firm. Thus, depending on the production 
output subsidy, the public firm might provide less production output than the private firm. 
This result comes from the fact that that both firms’ production outputs are strategic 
                                                  
10 Note that the subsidized profit of private firm is increasing in the subsidy rate, while social welfare, the 
objective of public firm, does not change. Since both firms’ production outputs are strategic substitutes, the 
public firm decreases its production output as private firm increases its production output according to the 
increase of the subsidy rate. 
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substitutes and thus, the public firm provides less production output when the output subsidy 
rate is higher. Further, note that both firms can enjoy the full sharing of the R&D output and 
thus, their R&D choices do not matter with the R&D externalities in the cost-reducing effect. 
Thus, the production output choice of the public firm solely depends on the production output 
choice of the private firm under production output subsidy.11   
Subsequently, the government chooses a production output subsidy rate to maximize the 
social welfare, which yields the following optimal production subsidy rate: 
	ݏ௤ ൌ ଷ଺ଶ଼ଽሺ௔ି௖ሻହହଽଶହ ≅ 0.649ሺa െ cሻ ൐ 0.        (22) 
The equilibrium outcomes under the full sharing of R&D output are as follows: 
ݔ଴௢ ൌ ଶଶଶସ଻ሺ௔ି௖ሻହହଽଶହ ≅ 0.398ሺa െ cሻ ൐ ݔଵ௢ ൌ
ଽଷ଼଼ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ହହଽଶହ ≅ 0.168ሺa െ cሻ and 
ݍ଴௢ ൌ ଶ଴ହ଼ଵሺ௔ି௖ሻହହଽଶହ ≅ 0.368ሺa െ cሻ ൏ ݍଵ௢ ൌ
ଶହ଼ଵ଻ሺ௔ି௖ሻ
ହହଽଶହ ≅ 0.46ሺa െ cሻ. 
Note that ݔ଴௢ ൐ ݔଵ௢ but ݍ଴௢ ൏ ݍଵ௢ at equilibrium. This shows that the public firm undertakes 
more R&D but provides less production output than the private firm. This is contrast to the 
established result in the literature of mixed oligopoly, in which the public firm will undertake 
more R&D and provide more production output than the private firm even though the public 
firm can be inefficient in its production. However, under the full sharing of R&D output, this 
story can be reversed because the externality effect of the R&D spillovers can be fully 
internalized. Regarding the R&D investment, the welfare-maximizing public firm has a larger 
incentive to undertake more R&D than the profit-maximizing private firm, but both R&D 
investments are still lower than the first-best, that is, ݔ௜ி ൐ ݔ଴௢ ൐ ݔଵ௢ . Regarding the 
                                                  
11 In the Appendix, we analyze the optimal production output subsidy with the R&D spillovers rate and show 
that there exists a threshold of R&D spillovers, for which the public firm provides less (more) production output 
than the private firm with a higher (lower) R&D spillovers. 
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production output, however, the welfare-maximizing public firm provides less production 
output than the profit-maximizing private firm, but both production outputs are still lower 
than the first-best, that is, ݍ௜ி ൐ ݍଵ௢ ൐ ݍ଴௢. This is because a higher R&D cost discourages the 
public firm from increasing its production output, whereas a higher production output subsidy 
encourages the private firm to increase its production output. Due to the production output 
substitution effect between homogeneous products, this can result in a better balance of 
production costs between the firms, from the viewpoint of welfare. That is, each firm can 
receive beneficial R&D spillovers from its rival under an agreement-based incentive subsidy, 
but the cost savings under a production output subsidy can compensate for the wasteful cost 
asymmetry associated with the public firm’s higher R&D investment relative to that of the 
private firm. Therefore, an incentive production output subsidy yields two production-related 
inefficiencies: the production output level is sub-optimal and the distribution of the 
production costs between the firms is not efficient.  
Finally, we have the following profit and social welfare under the incentive production output 
subsidy policy, respectively:: 
ߨଵ௢ ൌ ଵଶସସଽ଴଴ସଷସଷଵଶ଻଺଴ହ଺ଶହ ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ≅ 0.398ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ and ܹ௢ ൌ
ଶଷସ଻ଽ
ହହଽଶହ ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ≅ 0.420ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ. 
Proposition 3. Under a mutual agreement on the full sharing of R&D outputs, an incentive 
R&D subsidy provides higher welfare than an incentive production output subsidy. 
Proof. We can show that (i) the private firm will choose the full sharing of its R&D output 
under an incentive output subsidy, that is, ߨଵ∗ሺ1,0ሻ ൌ 0.355ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ  < ߨଵ௢ሺ1,1ሻ ൌ
0.398ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ, but (ii) the welfare under a production output subsidy is lower than that under 
an R&D subsidy, that is, ܹோሺ1,1ሻ ൌ 0.476ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ ൐ ܹ௢ሺ1,1ሻ ൌ 0.420ሺܽ െ ܿሻଶ. 
This proposition implies that the efficiency gains from an R&D subsidy are relatively larger 
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than those from a production subsidy.12  It supports the findings in Kesavayuth and Zikos 
(2013), who assumed exogenous spillovers in the cost-reducing R&D and showed that if 
spillovers are high, then an increase in R&D incentivized by an R&D subsidy generates a 
larger overall cost reduction compared to a production output subsidy.13 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The role of the government in R&D sharing activities among innovative firms is significantly 
relevant in the current economics of the innovation system. We investigated the incentives of 
R&D output sharing in a mixed duopoly and showed that without the government’s 
intervention, the public firm chooses full sharing whereas the private firm enjoys free-riding. 
We then devised an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy scheme to internalize the R&D 
spillovers, in which both firms earn higher payoffs by full sharing of their R&D outputs. We 
also showed that an agreement-based R&D subsidy is welfare-superior to a production output 
subsidy policy.  
There remain some topics for future research. We used the simplified Cournot duopoly model 
with homogeneous products in cost-reducing innovation under endogenous choice of R&D 
spillovers. However, the strategic choice of R&D output sharing crucially depends on the 
innovation of the products in different industries and regions. Thus, further examinations of 
the endogenous market structure, such as Cournot, Bertrand, and Stackelberg, should be 
analyzed under a differentiated products market. 
 
                                                  
12 It also shows that the irrelevance result does not hold in the presence of R&D. See, Lee and Tomaru (2017) 
and Lee, et al (2017). 
13 When spillovers are sufficiently low, however, Lee, et al. (2017) showed that a production output subsidy is 
welfare-superior to an R&D subsidy, but the government has a higher incentive to privatize the public firm 
under a production output subsidy than under the R&D subsidy. 
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Appendix: Optimal Production Output Subsidy with R&D Spillovers 
We analyze the optimal production output subsidy under the symmetric R&D spillovers rates 
between the two firms, i.e., ݀ ∈ ሾ0,1ሿ, where the profit of the firm is defined as follows: 
ߨ௜ ൌ ൫ܽ െ ݍ଴ െ ݍଵሻݍ௜ െ ሺܿ െ ݔ௜ െ ݀ݔ௝൯ݍ௜ െ ݍ௜ଶ െ ݔ௜ଶ ൅ ݏ௤ݍ௜,						݅ ് ݆ ൌ 0,1.   
In the third stage, solving the first-order conditions yields the equilibrium outputs: 
ݍ଴୓ ൌ ଷሺ௔ି௖ሻା௫బሺସିௗሻି௫భሺଵିସௗሻି௦೜ଵଵ  and .ݍଵ୓ ൌ
ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻି௫బሺଵିଷௗሻା௫భሺଷିௗሻାଷ௦೜
ଵଵ    
In the second stage, using the previous results and taking output subsidy as given, solving the 
first-order conditions yields the equilibrium R&D investment: 
ݔ଴୓ ൌ ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଶହାଷ଺ௗିଶௗ
మሻିଷሺଵ଻ି଻଻ௗାଶ଴ௗమିଶௗయሻ௦೜
ଵଵሺଵ଺଻ାହ଴ௗିହଶௗమାଶௗయሻ  and ݔଵ୓ ൌ
ଶሺଷିௗሻሺଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଷାௗሻାሺହସା଺ௗିଽௗమሻ௦೜ሻ
ଵଵሺଵ଺଻ାହ଴ௗିହଶௗమାଶௗయሻ . 
Note that output subsidy encourages the R&D investment of the private firm while its effect 
on that of the public firm depends on the R&D spillovers rate. In particular, it will discourage 
if the spillovers rate is low while it will encourages if the spillovers rate is high. This provides 
the equilibrium production outputs: 
ݍ଴୓ ൌ ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺହଷାଷଵௗିଵ଼ௗ
మሻିሺଶଵହିଵ଺ଷௗାଵଵௗమାଶ଴ௗయି଺ௗరሻ௦೜
ଵଵሺଵ଺଻ାହ଴ௗିହଶௗమାଶௗయሻ  and ݍଵ୓ ൌ
ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଷାௗሻାሺହସା଺ௗିଽௗమሻ௦೜
ଵ଺଻ାହ଴ௗିହଶௗమାଶௗయ . 
Note that output subsidy encourages the output of the private firm, but discourages that of the 
public firm. The profit of the private firm and social welfare are, respectively: 
ߨଵை ൌ ଶሺଵ଴ଷାଵଶௗିଶௗ
మሻሺଵଵሺ஺ି௖ሻሺଷାௗሻାሺହସା଺ௗିଽௗమሻ௦೜ሻమ
ଵଶଵሺଵ଺଻ାହ଴ௗିହଶௗమାଶௗయሻమ  and 
ܹை ൌ
ଶସଶሺ௔ି௖ሻమሺ଻଻ଷ଺ା଺ହହ଴ௗିଶସଽହௗమିଵ଻ଶ଼ௗయାସ଻଼ௗరሻ
ା଺଺ሺ௔ି௖ሻ൫଺ଵହଽାଵ଴ଶହହௗା଼ଷ଼ௗమିସ଺ଷ଼ௗయାଽ଴ௗరା଺଴଴ௗఱିଵ଴଼ௗల൯௦೜
ିଷሺଶହ଴଴ଶହାଵଷ଺ଵଷ଼ௗିଵ଺଼ହ଴ଵௗమିଶଵ଺଴ସௗయାଷସହ଺଺ௗరି଻ସଽ଺ௗఱାଷ଺଼ௗలାଶସ଴ௗళିଷ଺ௗఴሻ௦೜మ
଺଻ସଽଵଷ଼ାସ଴ସଵସ଴଴ௗିଷହଽ଼଴ହ଺ௗమିଵ଴ଽ଺଻ସସௗయା଻଴ଶ଻଺଼ௗరିହ଴ଷଷ଺ௗఱାଽ଺଼ௗల . 
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We turn to the first stage where the government determines the output subsidy to maximize 
welfare. Then, using previous results and differentiating welfare with respect to ݏ௤ yield the 
optimal production output subsidy rate: 
	ݏ௤ ൌ ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺ଺ଵହଽାଵ଴ଶହହௗା଼ଷ଼ௗ
మିସ଺ଷ଼ௗయାଽ଴ௗరା଺଴଴ௗఱିଵ଴଼ௗలሻ
ଶହ଴଴ଶହାଵଷ଺ଵଷ଼ௗିଵ଺଼ହ଴ଵௗమିଶଵ଺଴ସௗయାଷସହ଺଺ௗరି଻ସଽ଺ௗఱାଷ଺଼ௗలାଶସ଴ௗళିଷ଺ௗఴ ൐ 0.    
Note that the optimal production output subsidy rate is positive and increasing in the 
spillovers rate, i.e., డ௦೜డௗ ൐ 0.	 Finally, the equilibrium outcomes under the optimal production 
output subsidy are as follows: 
ݔ଴୓ ൌ ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଵ଻଻଻ସାଷସହଵଵௗାଵ଺ଶସௗ
మିଵ଴ଽଽଵௗయାଵସ଺ଷௗరାଶଷଷௗఱିଵଷ଼ௗలାଵ଼ௗళሻ
ଶହ଴଴ଶହାଵଷ଺ଵଷ଼ௗିଵ଺଼ହ଴ଵௗమିଶଵ଺଴ସௗయାଷସହ଺଺ௗరି଻ସଽ଺ௗఱାଷ଺଼ௗలାଶସ଴ௗళିଷ଺ௗఴ and   
ݔଵ୓ ൌ ଶሺ௔ି௖ሻሺଵଽସସଽାଵ଴ଵଷସௗିଵ଴ଵ଻ଵௗ
మିଶଷ଼଺ௗయାଵ଻଻ଶௗరାଽ଼ௗఱିଵଷ଼ௗలାଵ଼ௗళሻ
ଶହ଴଴ଶହାଵଷ଺ଵଷ଼ௗିଵ଺଼ହ଴ଵௗమିଶଵ଺଴ସௗయାଷସହ଺଺ௗరି଻ସଽ଺ௗఱାଷ଺଼ௗలାଶସ଴ௗళିଷ଺ௗఴ.  
ݍ଴୓ ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻሺ଻ଵସଶ଴ା଺ଵ଴ସଷௗିସଶ଺଺଻ௗ
మିଵ଺ହ଴଺ௗయାଵ଴ଷସଶௗరିଵସ଻଴ௗఱାଵ଺ଶௗలሻ
ଶହ଴଴ଶହାଵଷ଺ଵଷ଼ௗିଵ଺଼ହ଴ଵௗమିଶଵ଺଴ସௗయାଷସହ଺଺ௗరି଻ସଽ଺ௗఱାଷ଺଼ௗలାଶସ଴ௗళିଷ଺ௗఴ and  
ݍଵ୓ ൌ ଵଵሺ௔ି௖ሻሺ଺ସ଼ଷାହହଷଽௗିଵହସସௗ
మିଵଷଵ଴ௗయାଵହସௗరା଼ସௗఱିଵ଼ௗలሻ
ଶହ଴଴ଶହାଵଷ଺ଵଷ଼ௗିଵ଺଼ହ଴ଵௗమିଶଵ଺଴ସௗయାଷସହ଺଺ௗరି଻ସଽ଺ௗఱାଷ଺଼ௗలାଶସ଴ௗళିଷ଺ௗఴ. 
ܹை ൌ ሺ௔ି௖ሻమሺଵସଶ଻଼଻ାଵଶଵ଴ହସௗିହ଼ଶଵଵௗమିଶ଼ଵ଻଺ௗయାଵଵସ଼ଶௗరିଵଶସ଼ௗఱାଵସସௗలሻହ଴଴଴ହ଴ାଶ଻ଶଶ଻଺ௗିଷଷ଻଴଴ଶௗమିସଷଶ଴଼ௗయା଺ଽଵଷଶௗరିଵସଽଽଶௗఱା଻ଷ଺ௗలାସ଼଴ௗళି଻ଶௗఴ. 
From the comparisons, we have ݔ଴୓ வழ ݔଵ୓ and ݍ଴୓
ழ
வ ݍଵ୓ if ݀
வ
ழ 0.067. Thus, we can show 
that there exists a threshold of R&D spillovers rate, for which the public firm provides less 
(more) production output and takes more (less) R&D investment than the private firm with a 
higher (lower) R&D spillovers. Note that the difference of ݔ଴୓ െ ݔଵ୓ is increasing in the 
spillovers rate while the difference of ݍ଴୓ െ ݍଵ୓ is decreasing in the spillovers rate. Finally, 
social welfare is also increasing in the spillovers rate. 
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